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Unweaving the Phisher’s Net: 
 An Exploratory Study 
 
Begoña Pérez-Mira 




Over 29,000 phishing emails are reported each month on average to the AntiPhishing Working Group. If we consider that at least 5% of 
these emails achieve their target, at least 1,450 distinct email users a month are caught in the phisher’s net. This study attempts to 
understand the basic deception techniques utilized by phishers when creating the phishing emails. Exploratory content and linguistic 
analyses are performed to elicit the most widely used deception techniques and linguistic features that seem to be prominent in phishing 
emails. Preliminary results provide evidence to support that phishers utilize a very reduced and recognizable subset of deception 
techniques. Moreover, paired with these deception techniques, specific linguistic features seem to create a recognizable pattern of phishing 
emails that can be used to aid detection and filtering.  
Keywords  
Phishing, deception theory, linguistic analysis. 
INTRODUCTION 
It was November 2005, Susan, a mathematician with an acute inclination for gardening checked her email for the 
tenth time. She was quickly answering her student’s questions until one email caught her attention; the sender was “EBay – 
Customer Support Notification.” She had discovered a wonderful nursery in Houston, TX, with a well-constructed eBay 
Store. The store sold rare plants that had quickly became part of her greenhouse. Today, she was expecting a new shipment. 
She could not wait to open the package and add the new additions to her already award-winning garden. So that email caught 
her attention with the subject line: “IMPORTANT: Update your eBay information to secure prompt shipment.” Susan rapidly 
opened the email and scanned the contents. There had been an issue with the shipping of her plants; the email referenced a 
store order number, and it requested a shipment information update. Susan clicked on the provided link, updated her account 
information, and submitted the form. After taking care of the shipping problem, she went back to her daily grading and 
emailing routine. A day later, she received the plants as stated in the eBay description. She also received a call from her bank. 
Her account was overdrawn; a couple of important checks were going to be denied payment. She quickly checked her online 
bank account, and she realized that charges for more than $1500 had been made with her bank card from a point sale in 
Poland. The money was gone, and she was in despair. She had been a victim of identity theft, and she did not know how it 
had happened.  
 Susan was a victim of identity theft through phishing. According to the AntiPhishing Working Group website 
(http://www.antiphishing.org), Phishing uses social-engineering and technical subterfuges to steal consumers’ identity data 
and personal financial credentials. The first mention of a the term “phishing” appeared more than 10 years ago1, and this is a 
crime that according to the Anti-Phishing Working Group and the Binational Working Group (2006)  does not seem to be 
slowing down. The number of reported phishing attempts reported to the APWG grew from 25,624 in August 2007 to over 
38,500 in September 20072. In just a year, the number increased by over 13,000. Moreover, according to the same group, 5% 
of all the phishing attempts are successful; the number of estimated individual losses from these successful phishing attempts 
already reaches over a billion dollars. But phishing does not only attack individuals. It also undermines the hijacked 
companies by reducing individual trust in email communication. Phishing is a real threat, and it is not going away any time 
soon. 
 
1 phish, v." OED Online, March 2006, Oxford University Press.. Oxford English Dictionary Online.
2 The Anti-phishing Working Group (http://www.antiphishing.org/) 
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There have been some attempts to fight phishing. Software companies that specialize in anti-phishing code have developed 
different tools to attempt to fight phishing emails. Some of the most popular tools are anti-phishing toolbars adopted by the 
latest Internet browsers (i.e. Internet Explorer); however, a study conducted by the CyLab found that out of the 10 toolbars 
they examined, even the best ones still failed to identify more than 15% of phishing emails (Lorrie, 2006).  This is still a large 
number, as a 5% success rate in that 15% rate of failure could easily account for millions of dollars in losses. Even with the 
efforts of software companies, hardware companies, and the government, phishing attacks are on the rise. Perhaps then, we 
need to better understand phishing at the level of the basic building blocks. We should ask these questions: Why is phishing 
so powerful? Why, if we know what it is and how it works, can we not seem to be able to fight it properly? And what 
elements of those phishing emails are so powerful that even an educated and knowledgeable person can be fooled by them? 
 This study is an attempt to partially answer some of these questions. To understand the basic deceptive techniques of 
phishing emails, actual phishing emails were analyzed in terms of deceptive techniques and also in terms of linguistic 
features. This paper presents the results of this preliminary study and suggestions for further research. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Deception Theory  
The fields of accounting and finance have a rich history of fraud research. In these studies, fraud is analyzed as a game of 
deception in which the deceiver introduces a false representation of reality to the target and the target is expected then to take 
the deceiver’s expected action (Buller, Strzyzewski, and Comstock, 1991). In the case of accounting, for example, the 
deceiver creates fictitious transactions to deceive auditors so that auditors may identify them as authentic and accept them. 
There have been many studies utilizing deception theory3, but a particular study by Johnson et al. (1993) is of special interest. 
The researchers adopt Whaley and Bell’s deception taxonomy (1991) to describe a set of deception strategies or tactics. 
Dissimulative strategies attempt to hide reality, and simulative strategies attempt to show the false as real. Based on 
dissimulative strategies, the authors propose seven distinct deception tactics: masking, double lay, mimicking, dazzling, 
inventing, repackaging, and decoying. These seven deception tactics are used by the deceiver with two main goals in mind: 
(1) to convince the target that the deception is authentic (incorrect representation of reality); (2) to hide the fact that the 
deception is false (correct representation of reality). The following table summarizes the deception tactics and their 
definitions (Johnson, Karim Jamal, 1993). 
 
Deception  Definition 
Masking Deleting elements in the representation that would suggest the correct 
representation (i.e. deleting an item that would convince the user that 
the email is a fraud)  
Double Play Manipulating attributes in the environment in a way so as to weakly 
suggest the correct representation. (i.e. referencing the environment of 
the item such as a shipping, a payment, or a previous purchase) 
Mimicking Modifying attributes in the environment in a way so as to suggest the 
incorrect representation (i.e. adding well known organization logos to 
the email) 
Dazzling Modifying the environment in such a way as to obscure or blur these 
attributes whose interpretation suggests the correct representation, and 
to emphasize these attributes whose representation suggests the 
incorrect one. (i.e. hiding the real URL under a typed up fake one) 
Inventing Adding new attributes to the environment in order to suggest the 
incorrect representation  
Repackaging Modifying attributes in the environment in order to hinder the 
generation of the correct representation 
3 See Vrij 2003 for an up to date review of deception theory studies.  
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Decoying Adds new attributes to the environment in order to hinder the 
representation of the correct representation. 
Table 1 - Deception tactics (Johnson et al 1993). 
This taxonomy has been used to explain deception in fields outside of accounting, as well. Biros, George, and Zmud 
(2002) utilize this taxonomy to create deceptive data to analyze sensitivity to deception in order to improve decision-making 
performance. In the marketing field, Burke, DeSarbo, Oliver, and Robertson (1988) analyze the deceptive effects of 
advertising claims in a set of computer-constructed ads for fake pain reliever medication. In this study, the different levels of 
deception tactics proposed by Johnson and Grazioli are used to create the deceptive ads presented to the participants. 
Kauffman and Wood (2000) utilized deception theory to analyze opportunistic behavior in online auction marketplaces. 
Grazioli and Jarvenpaa published three articles that applied deception theory to Internet fraud. In their first article, “Perils of 
Internet Fraud,” the authors utilized the deception tactics specified by Johnson et al. to create different variations of a 
fraudulent e-commerce website in an attempt to measure the relationship between deception and trust and the level of 
perceived risk. In their study, most of their subjects failed to detect the deception tactics utilized in the experiment. Their 
study showed that by using deceptive tactics the fraudulent sites not only avoided detection but also increased trust (Grazioli, 
2000). Their second article, “Consumer and Business Deception on the Internet,” was similarly based on the deceptive 
techniques stated by Johnson et al., but this study added a new layer of understanding to the tactics, analyzing which ones 
were more likely to be used by the deceiver in the case of a consumer deception or a business deception. Their results 
suggested that deceivers do select tactics according to targets and their own purported identities  (Grazioli, 2003). Finally, the 
third article looks at Internet deception as a whole to specifically identify what types of deception techniques are the most 
widely used by deceivers. They analyzed a total of 201 cases collected from magazines, newspaper articles, and court 
proceedings that occurred between 1995 and 2000. Their study shows that the “inventing” deception tactic (making up the 
information about the “core”—i.e. electronic auction sellers who simply do not have the promised merchandise to sell) is the 
most widely used deception tactic in Internet fraud.  
 Even though Grazioli’s 2003 paper analyzed deception techniques widely used by deceivers, the study did not center 
on phishing attempts. Instead, the data collected is extremely varied, and the study does not reflect any consideration of 
different group comparison. Generalizations about Internet fraud as a subject are very difficult to make. Hence, it is important 
to study a specific attempt type and try to understand the mechanics of the deception techniques used in that specific type. 
For example, in the fight against phishing, it is important to know and categorize what elements inside these phishing emails 
are most often used by phishers to deceive and influence the target to behave in the desired way. The generalizations stated 
by Grazioli’s 2003 study are not detailed enough to portray this type of detailed information. 
 
Phishing Research 
Phishing is still a very young subject. A direct “phishing” library keyword search yields only 12 results: 5 of those are 
government documents that explain the fraud and give advice to avoid it; 5 refer back to generic Internet fraud; and, only 2 
results are specific for phishing fraud (Lance, 2005; Jakobson, 2007). A directed search of the Lexis-Nexis database provides 
more than 100 articles that contain the word “phishing.” Just a few of these articles contain discussions of specific tactics or 
items used by deceivers in phishing emails. For the most part, the articles focus more on generic ways to describe a sample 
phishing email, how to avoid being phished, the actual coding procedures, or their distribution and reach (Jagatic, Johnson, 
Jakobsson, and Menczer, 2007). Not many articles, only 17 of the ones retrieved, discuss the actual deceptive tactics that 
phisher uses when creating the phishing emails. A result of the most-cited tactics and techniques and how they are 
categorized in deception theory are summarized in the tables below. 
 
Technique Deception Tactic 
Using IP addresses instead of domain names in 
hyperlinks that address the fake website (Alliance 2005) 
Dazzling 
Embedding hyperlinks  from the real target web site into 
the HTML contents about the fake phishing website 
(Alliance 2005) (Drake et al. 2004) 
Decoying 
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Encoding or obfuscating the fake web site URL(Alliance 
2005) (Drake et al. 2004) 
Dazzling 
Registering similar sounding DNS domains (Alliance 
2005) 
Dazzling 
Using a pop-up window over the real website (Emm 
2006) 
Decoying 
Using well known logos, lettering, and format 
(Thompson 2006) (Lynch 2005) (Drake et al. 2004) 
Mimicking  
Grammatical / Spelling Errors (Knight 2005) (-Mimicking) 
Table 2 - Email Formatting Techniques 
Technique Deception Tactic 
Asking for account verification (Thompson 2006) (Drake 
et al. 2004) 
Inventing 
Threats of account closure (Lynch 2005) (Drake et al. 
2004) 
Inventing 
Table 3 - Email Content Techniques 
It is interesting to note that “Grammatical/Spelling Errors” functions as a negative deception technique (-Mimicking) that 
works to help elicit the deceitfulness core of the phishing attempt. Some of the articles surveyed presented this characteristic 
as a well-known technique used to spot phishing emails (Knight, 2005) and (APWG, 2006).  
Linguistic Features 
 Burgoon’s et al. article “Detecting Deception through Lingustic Analysis” (2003) provides a different perspective on 
the fight against deception.  The article presents results from preliminary tests where linguistic features are utilized to assess 
the deceptiveness or truthfulness of a piece of pre-fabricated text.  The authors utilize four different types of linguistic 
indicators in their textual fabrications: Quantity (number of syllables, words, and sentences), Vocabulary Complexity 
(number of “big” words, number of syllables per word), Grammatical Complexity (number of short sentences, long 
sentences, average number of words per sentence), and Specificity and Expressiveness (emotiveness index, rate of adjectives 
and adverbs, and number of affective terms). Results from the experiment posit that the indicators are helpful when 
distinguishing the deceiving utterances from the truthful ones. According to the study, “the deceivers had significantly fewer 
long sentences, fewer average syllables-per-word, and a lower sentence complexity than truth tellers” (Burgoon et al. 2003).  
Extending the results of their study, we might consider that since phishing emails are deceiving pieces of text, it seems 
possible that the same linguistic features may be clues that help distinguish phishing emails from authentic ones. If these 
indicators proved significant for phishing emails when compared with other written texts, the linguistic analysis could give us 
another level of understanding of the deceiving creations.   
In the fight against phishing, it is important to know and categorize what elements inside these phishing emails are 
most often used by phishers to deceive the target and what techniques are most often used by these deceivers to influence the 
targets to behave in the desired way (basically, click the link and give the information out). The generalizations stated by 
Grazioli’s 2003 study are not detailed enough to portray this type of detailed information and the studies discussed above are 
just pieces of the overall phishing realm. It is necessary to have a systematic approach to the research and analysis of 
phishing emails. As such, we need to understand and know (1) what deception tactics are most widely used by phishers and 
(2) how are phishing emails different to “normal” emails. If we understand these features a bit better, maybe we will have a 
better position in spotting the phishing emails, filtering them out, and ultimately reducing the amount of phishing emails that 
are received by the user.  
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RESEARCH METHOD 
Sample Selection 
The data (phishing emails) were collected from 3 different sources: (1) the Anti-Phishing Group 
(http://www.antiphishing.org/), (2) the European counterpart, MillersMiles.co.uk (http://www.millersmiles.co.uk/), and (3) 
the researcher’s personal collection of phishing emails. The first two sources (website archives) contain the images only (not 
the actual text files) of phishing emails that had been reported starting as early as the 5th of March 2003. 
For the first exploratory analysis (deceptive features), 25 phishing emails were selected. The phishing emails were 
collected from the phishing archives kept by the MillersMiles and the Antiphising Group website. At the time of this paper, 
the archival websites contained more than 378,079 examples of phishing scams. The emails were randomly selected from a 
pool of 100 (a list of 25 random numbers were generated using Excel, and the selection was transposed to the 100 pool of 
phishing emails provided by the archive). The 25 unique phishing emails were analyzed for accuracy and relevance. 
For the second exploratory analysis (linguistic features), 25 unique phishing emails were randomly selected from the 
researcher’s collection of phishing emails following the same random procedure4.
Data and Analysis Methods 
A content analysis was conducted on the first data set (images of phishing emails collected from the archival 
websites). Two coders simultaneously coded the images following the deception theory techniques proposed by Johnson et 
al. (1993) as top level codes: Mimicking (positive and negative), Dazzling, Decoying, Masking, Inventing, Relabeling, and 
Double Play . The intent of the analysis was twofold: (1) to elicit more instances and examples of deceitful elements from the 
sample selected and (2) to determine which of the deceptive techniques were used more frequently by the phishers at the time 
the sample was retrieved. 
The second dataset was examined using linguistic analysis. The analysis was conducted using Oxford WordSmith 
Tools 4. The phishing emails were analyzed as a single text to account for textual features such as word frequency, sentence 
length, and word count. The emails were also compared against a well-established corpus of one million words in American 
Written English (the FROWN Corpus) to elicit any possible differences between mainframe American Written English and 
the phishing emails. All emails were saved as text files (no markup language was analyzed, just basic text) and imported into 




In all the emails analyzed, the main goal of the deceiver was to convince the target to click on the provided link. The 
core of the deception was the narrative used by the deceiver to convince the user to click the deceiving link. To do so, the 
deceiver could use one or more of the seven deception techniques outlined by Johnson et al. (1993). The content analysis 
supported the list of phishing techniques revealed by the phishing articles in non-academic publications (see Table 2). There 
were many instances of Mimicking as described by Thompson (2006) and Lynch (2005), such as the use of logos, lettering, 
and structures from the real websites, and Dazzling as described by Alliance (2005), including hiding the real URL under a 
text link, a fake URL, or an image. Basically, the analysis showed that out of the seven techniques, Dazzling, Decoying,
Mimicking, and Inventing were those most used in phishing emails. Masking (eliminating crucial characteristics of the core) 
and Relabeling were not used at all in the sample of phishing emails selected. Double play (the core is exchanged against the 
deceiver’s will) was linked to emails that contained somebody else’s information in them (such as the wrong email or the 
wrong account number). Inventing was present in all emails because the core was essentially “invented” by the deceiver. 
When the inventing techniques were sub-categorized at a lower level, three main topics arose: 1) inventing an account 
verification/update with threat of account closure or suspension, 2) account verification/update without any mention of a 
threat of closure or suspension, and 3) a seemingly innocent help issue. Instances of Decoying appeared in the majority of the 
phishing emails (use of real areas of the website, use of real phone numbers, and use of web addresses to increase perceived 
security). Table 4 provides a detailed summary of the deception techniques and their instances: 
 
4 At the time of the data collection, the author’s personal collection of phishing emails contained more than 250 specimens.  
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Phishing email instance 
Dazzling Hiding the real URL under a fake URL.  
Hiding the real URL under a hyperlinked background image. 
Hiding the real URL under a text link. 
Decoying Use of "Email ID" to make it more trustworthy 
Use of "do not reply". Use of the Identity theft threat. 
The email provides personal information such as case id number 
Use of real areas of the real website. All the links except the required ones are valid 
links from the real website.  
Piggy back on a real issue that took place: power failure. 
Use of real phone numbers.  
Using safe market place tips, links to report spoofing 
Use of https in the URL. Use of Email notification ID. 
Mimicking Use of financial institution logo. use of a high ranking employee name to make the 
email sound more official 
Use of logos, lettering, and structure for a pay-pal payment confirmation. 
Inventing New account info added, confirm/verify/authorize your account. 
Need for the phone number to ask for account verification.  
Account issues.  
Verify your information 
Question about a non completed transaction on eBay.  
Need your help.  
Complete the survey for a $20 credit to your account. 
Update your personal records for security purposes. 
Confirm payment.  
Help us re-gain the data.  
Unauthorized access from a third party. Please, check your records.  
EBay unpaid item dispute. 
Email added to the account, please verify. 
Add a debit card to your account to reduce fraud. 
Unusual transaction in the account. Limited access until confirmation. 
Multiple computers logged in, multiple logon failures. Account suspended. 
Account ready to expire. 
Question about a selling item on eBay. 
Upgrade in security measures, verify your account. 
Double Play The item sent out has a different user name. It may be used to confuse the user and to 
convince him/her that the account has been breached.  
The email does not have a username attached to it. It may be used to confuse the user 
and to convince him/her that the account has been breached. 
Table 4 - Deception Techniques. 
LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS  
The basic linguistic analysis showed some interesting results, as well. Oxford WordSmith 4 provided detailed 
information about word count, sentence length, and word frequency for the twenty-five analyzed phishing emails. According 
to the results, the emails ranged from 79 distinct words to 157 distinct words. The number of sentences ranged from 8 to 12, 
and the content words that appeared more frequently in the five emails were “eBay,” “account,” and “PayPal.” Two non-
content words that appeared very frequently in the five emails were “your” and “you,” the second-person pronouns. When 
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compared with the FROWN Corpus of Written American Words, the results showed that words that occur with unusually 
high frequency in these phishing emails that do not occur as frequently in the reference corpus were “EBay,” “PayPal,” 
“Account,” “update,” and “your.” While “EBay” and “PayPal” may not be of interest in this comparison, (they may not 
appear in the Frown Corpus due to its date) the high frequency of “account”, “update”, and “your” is significant for our study 
because these words do appear in the corpus. At the other end of the spectrum, words that do not occur in the analyzed 
phishing emails at an unusual rate in comparison with the reference corpus were “the” and “a,” two of the three English 
articles. 
DISCUSSION 
 The results from both analyses help to understand the different elements that make up a phishing email. It is very 
interesting to see how the different deception techniques are methodically applied to the deception attempts. Apart from the 
obvious techniques of mimicking (logos, lettering, structure) and decoying (hiding the real URL under an image, text, or a 
fake URL), the most impressive results are given by the subtle use of double play in phishing emails with widely recognized 
brands such as eBay and PayPal. Due to the large number of users and the fact that these are Internet-based companies, the 
possibility of reaching a target with an existing eBay or PayPal account is likely to be very high. It would be very easy for an 
email user to disregard a phishing email from a company with whom the user does not have an existing relationship. The 
problem usually arises when the user actually has an existing relationship with the hijacked bank or company. In those cases, 
the mere suspicion of an account breech may convince the target to click the link and meet the deceivers’ goal. It seems to me 
that the mimicking and decoying techniques would be easier to detect than these double play techniques.  
 Another interesting issue that is elicited by the analysis is the fact that the inventing techniques used are extremely 
limited. All emails included in the sample can be placed in one of the three categories: 1) inventing an account 
verification/update with threat of account closure or suspension, 2) account verification/update without any mention of a 
threat of closure or suspension, and 3) a seemingly innocent help issue. The linguistic analysis also supports this finding by 
showing the words “Account,” “records,” and “please” as some of the content words highest in frequency in all twenty-five 
phishing emails. 
 The same linguistic analysis provokes an interesting insight into the rhetoric of the phishing emails. The frequent 
use of the second-person pronouns “you” and “your” indicates an attempt towards a personalization of the phishing email. 
The deceiver, because the real name of the target is unknown, utilizes the pronouns to identify the target and create a sense of 
familiarity and closeness, which seems to increase trust. The fact that the phishing emails contain the words “the” and “a” 
less frequently than normal, also supports this idea. The articles “the” and “a” are more generic and impersonal; hence, they 
appear less frequently in the phishers’ emails.  
 
CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS,  AND FURTHER STUDIES 
 This preliminary study has attempted to shed some light on the understanding of the mechanics and internal 
techniques of phishing emails. However, this is not nearly enough. The sample was extremely limited (as this was an 
exploratory study) and hence, the conclusions are not sufficiently supported to be made general.  Further studies should build 
upon the results of this study. With the information gathered in this study, a corpus of phishing examples and instances that 
match the deception techniques and are generic across the board could be created. These techniques and examples could then 
be used in a follow-up study to analyze how these techniques really affect the targets. As an example, this follow-up study 
could be conducted in two different ways:  
1) Examples of real phishing emails containing different deception techniques could be presented to real users in a 
semi-structured interview setting. The researcher could then ask questions about how real/deceptive the email is 
perceived to be, and what elements of the email seem to be more or less real/deceptive?  
2) The researchers could conduct controlled experiments where only one type of phishing email with different 
variations of deceptive techniques is presented to the participants at a time.  Participants then could rate the 
deceptiveness level of each individual instance. 
An even more ambitious study could be performed by incorporating the constructs and relationships from Buller and 
Burgoon’s “Interpersonal Deception Theory.” This theory focuses on the context and environment of the communication 
exchange, the familiarity between the sender and both the deceptive message and the deceiver, and, of course, on the tactics 
and techniques utilized by the deceiver to live up to the message expectations (Buller and Burgoon, 1996). Adding the 
Interpersonal Deception Theory to the study could give the researchers a more complete model of phishing communication. 
Pérez-Mira  Unweaving the Phisher’s Net: An Exploratory Study 
 
Proceedings of the Fourteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Toronto, ON, Canada August 14th-17th 2008 8 
With a complete model of phishing communication exchanges created, more efficient and effective detection techniques 
could be developed to help stop the proliferation of successful phishing attempts. 
 Another important limitation of the study is the fact that the corpus utilized to make the frequency comparisons may 
lack some of the more technologically advanced texts. For this reason, a study that utilizes the BYU Corpus of American 
English (updated yearly since 1990) will improve the analysis and offer more insight in the similarities and differences 
between regular text, regular emails, and phishing emails. 
 In conclusion, even though some generalizations can be drawn from this preliminary study, there is still a lot to be 
learned from both the structure of the phishing emails and the communication exchange that takes place in a deceptive 
situation. More research is needed to better understand these two important issues and hopefully unweave the phisher’s net.  
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